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Introduction
THE Preparatory Committee for the New International Development
Strategy have suggested that development programmes concentrating on one,
or a few major projects, are likely to result in more successful implementa-
tion and achievement of targets in the Third U.N. Development Decade. [1]
This paper is concerned with the problem of measuring the impact on an
economy of a major project viz. a wood pulp mill projected to be con-
structed in Malawi. The location of the mill necessitates also significant
investment in roads, hospital facilities, education etc. Indeed a sizeable new
town will be created from what is at present largely bush. We briefly
describe the major characteristics of the Malawi economy, and outline the
nature of a pulpwood project that has been under consideration for some
years. We then examine the justification for departing from the orthodox
approach to project appraisal in order to incorporate multiplier effects.
Finally we present the results of the appraisal.
I. The Economy and the project
Since Malawi gained Independence in 1964 the Government has achieved
remarkable progress in developing the economy. Prior to independence the
economy and social and physical infrastructure had been neglected. In 1964
the population of approximately 4 million had a per capita income of K38 (1
Malawi Kwacha = U.S. $1.10). By 1978 the per capita income in real terms
of the 5.7 million population had risen to K68. The average annual increase
in gross domestic product at constant prices since 1964 has been 6.1 per
cent. Table 1 indicates that Malawi is a low income, but open and rapidly
developing agricultural economy.
The project is a wood pulp mill to be constructed at Chinteche on Lake
Malawi at the edge of the Viphya plateau. The climate and soil of the
Viphya plateau are ideally suited for the growing of pine trees. A plantation
programme was implemented as early as 1949, and U.K. aid finance has
been of assistance in expanding the plantation area to more than 43,000
hectares. The favourable soil and climate make it possible for the pine trees
to reach the required maturity at the rotation age of 16 years. Extraction of
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TABLE 1
The Malawi economy
Population 5.7 million
G.D.P. (at current market prices) 1978 $985.8
1964 $168.7 "
G.D.P. per capita (at current
market prices) 1978 $173.0 "
1964 $44.1 "
Growth rate G.D.P. 1964-78 at 1964 prices 6.1% per annum
Exports 1978 (f.o.b.) $173.0 million
Imports 1978 (c.i.f.) $244.0 "
Current Account deficit $116.0 "
Official External Reserves end June 1978 $80.3
Total Agricultural production per cent of G.D.P. . . . . 43%
Smallholder production per cent of G.D.P. 38%
Manufacturing production per cent of G.D.P 12%
Fixed investment per cent of G.D.P. 30%
Savings ratio 1976 16%
Principal exports 1978
Tobacco $97 million
Tea $32 "
Sugar $12 "
Groundnuts $6 "
Cotton $1 "
Rice $3 "
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, National Statistical Office Economic Report 1979.
Economic Planning Division (O.P.C.).
the timber will be by ox-skidding to the forest secondary road system, and
thence by 35 ton trucks to the pulp mill site on the lakeshore. The bleached
long fibre sulphate kraft pulp will be transported by barge and train to a
coastal port and by ship to its final export market destination. For the
purpose of this exercise to estimate the value of pulp sales, a c.i.f. Mediter-
ranean port price of $478 a ton is assumed. The primary benefit of the
project is the injection into the economy of a stream of foreign exchange
earnings. The location of the mill necessitates also significant investment in
roads, hospital facilities, education etc. Indeed a sizeable new town will be
created from what is at present largely bush. The capital cost of the
industrial part of the project at early 1978 cost levels is taken to be $242
million, and the required social infrastructure $104 million. The project will
create direct employment for approximately 8,000 people.
II. Justification for the use of the multiplier in the appraisal
Input-Output analysis was considered as one approach to assessing the
impact of the project on the economy. Unfortunately no recent input-output
account is available, and if one were constructed little confidence could be
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placed on coefficients derived from a single year. Moreover there is no
national income forecasting model, and, even if there were, one would have
serious doubts about the parameters.
The multiplier concept was conceived and developed primarily in the
context of macro-economic problems, [2]. In conventional project appraisal
methodology, [3], [4], while consideration is given to regional income
multipliers, and class-income multipliers, planners are advised to include the
multiplier effect applicable to short-run aggregate income benefits for the
entire economy only under certain conditions. The manuals issued by
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies as a guide to project planners, [5],
IBRD [6] are also careful to warn against the misplaced use of the
multiplier. The use of the multiplier in this particular instance therefore
requires justification.
Firstly it is usually argued that with given ratios of leakages from the
expenditure flow the national income multiplier is uniform for all autonom-
ous changes in expenditure functions. Thus for an extra $1 million invested
anywhere in the economy the multiplier effects are the same and one can
therefore ignore them in choosing between alternative projects. This as-
sumes that there are alternative projects in which the resources could be
used with equivalent effect.
However, in this case, there are no comparable alternatives in sight. The
injection of expenditure which motivates the multiplier in this project is an
increase in net foreign exchange earnings. By the later 1980s, this is
expected to have risen to $11 million. With the completion of the major
burden of debt service in 1995, thereafter net foreign exchange earnings rise
to $44.8 million, for all practical purposes, in perpetuity. One theoretical
alternative would be a sustained increase of about 15 per cent in agricultural
exports (allowing for the import content of exports) over and above what is
already in prospect. However, Malawi already has a substantial and vigorous
agricultural development programme. The Lilongwe Land Development
Programme, which is sometimes quoted as a model by the IBRD is one of
four similar projects in the country and the National Rural Development
Programme has recently been launched to plan investment in agriculture up
to the end of the century. Even if funds were available, it is most unlikely
that the rate of agricultural development could be significantly raised above
that already planned for the next decade or so. Another apparent alternative
would be a programme of manufacturing development to replace imports or
increase exports so as to achieve a net improvement in the balance of
payments equal to the project's contribution, over and above what will
otherwise emerge. This again can be ruled out as not feasible. Most of
Malawi's manufacturing consists of simple processing of agricultural crops
and is geared very closely to agricultural production, which, as already
noted, is close to its maximum rate of growth. Other kinds of manufacturing
would have such a high import content that an enormous increase in output
would be required to improve the, external account to levels achieved by the
Project. It is not Government policy to develop uncompetitive industries of
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any kind behind protective barriers, and an examination of the record of the
past decade lends support to the view that the policy has been justified.
Very recently, following the fuel crisis and the large rise in fertilizer
prices, an investigation of the possibility of developing deposits of coal and
pyrites has been started. The results are unlikely to be available for some
time, but mineral development is not at present regarded as a realistic
alternative.
It can therefore be concluded that if Malawi does not get the benefits of
the multiplier effects from Viphya Project, it cannot get them from
anywhere else. There is no feasible alternative project or set of projects in
sight that will have equivalent effects on income, employment, consumption,
savings and the balance of payments.
The second reason sometimes advanced for ignoring multiplier effects is
that the rise in income generating expenditure may be brought to a halt
prematurely because of bottlenecks in domestic supply, resulting in inflation-
ary pressures and/or balance of payments problems.
The limitation is probably not very important in the case of the Viphya
Project. It will be about a decade before the multiplier process really begins
to bite and in that time, there should be a substantial expansion of
productive capacity. With over 43 per cent of the population below the age
of 15 in 1970 (N.S.O. Population Change Survey) and inexorably moving up
into the working age groups, labour is not likely to be a bottleneck. Indeed,
anything that increases employment opportunities in the 1980s may be
regarded as a benefit in itself. Formal education, technical training and
apprenticeship programmes will increase the supply of skills, and if these
need topping up with a little expatriate expertise the project will itself
generate the required foreign exchange. The agricultural development
programme should ensure the availability of basic foods. It is also a virtue of
the project that it seems likely that, because the project, including the
plantations, will employ a large number of workers at relatively low wages,
the initial consumption expenditure will be mainly on "poor man's"
goods—basic food, locally produced household furniture, equipment and
clothing, local house building materials and so on—which are themselves
labour intensive, generating further rounds of expenditure on similar goods
with a low import content. For these reasons, the bottleneck problem arising
because of lack of complementary resources is not expected to be serious.
Thus with no alternative use for the funds in sight and the prospect of an
adequate supply of co-operating domestic resources, the use of the multip-
lier to quantify the total impact of the Viphya project is justified.
The multiplier is calculated as the reciprocal of the sum of the marginal
leakages from the flow of expenditures. The leakages usually identified are
savings imports and taxes. Two problems have arisen in estimating the size
of the multiplier in Malawi. First, there is the question of whether to derive
the marginal ratios from changes in total G.D.P. or from changes in
monetary G.D.P., and secondly, the treatment of taxes.
The National Accounts distinguish between monetary and non-monetary
394 PROJECT APPRAISAL AND THE MULTIPLIER
production, the latter accounting for about 31 per cent of G.D.P. at factor
cost in 1978 compared with about 47 per cent in 1964. It would, however,
be erroneous to think of two separate sectors. Non-monetary income is, in
fact, production for own use, and a very high proportion of
Malawians—probably the great majority—have some income of this kind,
mainly food production for family consumption. There are few, if any,
families who are wholly in the subsistence/barter sector, although there are
some whose income is entirely monetary. Families who have a subsistence
income invariably have a cash income as well—from wages and salaries,
trade or sale of crops. Expenditure may reasonably be regarded as a
function of total income not monetary income alone. In a good crop year,
the marketable surplus will be large and monetary income for smallholders
higher, with consequential effects on their purchases of goods for consump-
tion and investment and on their cash savings. In a bad crop year, a family
finding itself with a food deficit, will have to use part of its monetary
earnings or savings to buy food and cut down in other directions. The first
impact of the project will be on monetary income, but how that income is
disposed of will be related, among other things, to what is happening to
subsistence income. It has therefore seemed proper to derive the marginal
ratios for savings, imports and taxes from changes in total G.D.P., not from
monetary G.D.P. only.
With regard to taxes, Government expenditure on services such as
education and health is so constrained by revenue that any increase in
receipts from taxation would quickly find its way into the expenditure
stream. In some models for developed countries, where the level of
Government expenditure may be regarded as policy determined and year to
year variations in tax revenues mainly affect the borrowing requirement,
taxes may be treated as a leakage. In Malawi, the pressure for development
means that Government expenditure is maintained very close to the ceiling
that is consistent with balance of payments equilibrium for a very open
economy. Estimates of the marginal tax ratio indicate that it is fairly small
(approximately 0.09). Since the taxes are immediately pumped into the
economy in the form of government expenditure they are not considered as
a leakage.
For the multiplier analysis the relevant ratios can be grounded in recent
experience. The multiplier, k, is calculated from:
k = -
s + m
where s = the incremental ratio of savings to total G.D.P. over the period
1970 to 1978 and m = the incremental ratio of imports to total
G.D.P. over the period 1970 to 1978.
Although the National Accounts and Balance of Payments figures are of
good quality, errors in the year to year variations could lead to serious
272.0
18.1
55.0
624.0
125.5
0.20
89.8
0.14
896.0
143.6
144.8
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TABLE 2
Calculation of marginal ratios
K million
1970 1978
A. Calculation of Marginal Savings Ratio
1. Total G.D.P. at current market prices
2. Change in Total G.D.P.
3. Total Gross Savings
4. Change in Total Savings
5. Marginal Savings Ratio (s)
B. Calculation of Marginal Import Ratio
1. Import of Consumption and Intermediate goods . .
2. Change in Imports
3. Marginal Import Ratio (m)
Sources: National Accounts Reports 1964/71; N.S.O. Table B; Economic Reports 1970 to
1979; Balance of Payments Reports.
errors in the estimated ratio. To reduce the probable error, changes in
savings, imports and central government revenue between 1970 and 1978
have been expressed as fractions of the change in G.D.P. over the same
period, all at current prices. It is thought that this should reduce the
uncertainties about the annual figures and give results that can be accepted
with some confidence (See Table 2). Gross savings, estimated annually in
each Economic Report show a good deal of variation from year to year.
Being the relatively small difference between the large aggregates (G.D.P.
and Consumption), small errors in the original estimates produce quite large
errors in estimated savings in any year. The marginal savings ratio is
estimated to be 0.20.
The relevant imports are those induced by the expenditure of domestic
income. To a very large extent imports of capital goods are dependent on
TABLE 3
Estimation of the multiplier
Central
-15% Estimate +15%
Savings Ratio
Import Ratio
Total
(fc= \ 3.45 2.94 2.56
\ s + mj
Notes: Where fc=the Multiplier; s=the marginal savings ratio;
m = the marginal import ratio.
0.17
0.12
0.29
0.20
0.14
0.34
0.23
0.16
0.39
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grants and loans from abroad rather than on the level of income. This is
certainly true of the public sector and largely true of the private sector. In
order to concentrate on the imports that are related to income, the import
ratio is based on the change in imports for consumption and for inter-
mediate use between 1970 and 1978. The marginal import ratio is estimated
to be 0.14.
The results have been calculated for the estimated marginal ratios, and for
sets of ratios 15 per cent either side of them, in order to examine the
sensitivity of the impact of the project if the Multiplier varies.
III. The results of the appraisal
The benefit stream of the project is the net direct foreign exchange
earnings from the exported pulp. This stream of injections into the flow of
income and expenditure in Malawi will induce further increases in income,
consumption, savings, imports, and tax revenues via the operation of the
multiplier.
The results are set out for what may be thought of as an average year in
the late 1980s, when the process will have raised national income to a new
equilibrium level, and for 1996 which is the first year that all the interest
and amortization for the mill is paid off, and the burden of infrastructure
loan redemption falls significantly, (Table 4). The multiplier effects of the
initial construction period are omitted because setting up the mill is a once
for all injection not a regular stream, and its import content is high, making
its contribution to the domestic expenditure stream rather small. The
imports at this stage would be financed by loans from abroad whose service
and redemption is allowed for in the calculations.
The impact of the Project on Malawi Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.) is
calculated by the Multiplier (k), times the net direct foreign exchange
receipts in that year (F).
The impact of the Project on Savings and Imports, are calculated from
rk(F) where:
r = the relevant marginal propensity
fc = the multiplier
F= the net direct foreign exchange receipts.
Consumption of Malawi domestically produced goods and services is derived
as the residual. The net improvement in the foreign trade balance is equal to
the net direct foreign exchange receipts in that year, less the induced
imports.
The stability of all categories of expenditure except consumption when all
the ratios are changed uniformly one way, or the other, was not unexpected.
A bigger s, or m, reduces the multiplier k, so that the changes are bigger
proportions of a smaller income.
The sensitivity of the projects impact on the National Economy to
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TABLE 4
The project's estimated net direct foreign exchange earnings (U.S. $ million at 1st January, 1978
prices)
Net Direct Foreign Exchange Receipts
1988 1996
86.1
3.0
10.9
0.7
0.6
3.0
0.1
67.8
3.0
10.9
0.7
0.6
3.0
0.1
67.8
A. Receipts
(a) Value of Pulp Sales c.i.f. Mediterranean Port 86.1
Less
(b) Volume discount or sales commission
(c) Ocean Freight and Insurance
(d) Nacala harbour dues
(e) Warehousing
(f) Rail Transport from Malawi border to Nacala . .
(g) Insurance
Equals
(h) Value of Pulp at border
B. Payments
Capital charges
(a) Interest 2.0
(b) Amortization 15.0
(c) Replacements
(d) Infrastructure loan redemption
(e) Dividends
(f) External loan service charge
Operating costs
(g) Lake fleet
(h) Rail
(i) Variable costs
(j) Fixed costs
(k) Pulpwood
(1) Fuelwood
(m) Woodlands Personnel
(n) Mill Personnel
0.5
18.3
1.1
0.6
0.7
1.8
8.7
3.7
2.6
0.3
0.3
1.2
56.8
11.0
1.0
1.0
1.1
0.6
0.7
1.8
8.7
3.7
2.6
0.3
0.3
1.2
23.0
44.8
TABLE 5
Impact of the project on C.D.P. (Million U.S. $)
Central
Estimate of
k
1988 1996
fc + 15%
1988 1996
k -
1988
15%
1996
Increase in G.D.P. 32.3 131.7 28.1 114.7 38.0 153.5
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TABLE 6
Impact of the project on savings, imports, consumption and the foreign trade balance
(.Million U.S. $)
Increase in Savings
Increase in Imports
Increase in Consumption
from Malawi
Production
Net Minimum
improvement in
Foreign Balance
Central
Estimate of fc
(2.94)'
1988 1996
6.5 26.3
4.5 18.4
21.3 87.0
6.5 26.3
fc +15%
(2.56)'
1988 1996
6.5 26.3
4.5 18.4
17.1 70.0
6.5 26.3
fc - 1 5 %
(3.45)'
1988 1996
6.5 26.1
4.5 18.4
27.0 109.0
6.5 26.4
Note: See Table 3 for estimate of the multiplier fc.
changes of plus and minus 15 per cent of the central estimate of net foreign
exchange earnings of the mill is shown in Table 7.
The analysis indicates that even with variations of 15 per cent in the
major parameters, namely the multiplier, and net foreign exchange earnings
of the mill, the Project still makes a major contribution to the development
of the National Economy.
We may illustrate the impact of the project on the National Economy
against the development of the economy up to 1988 and 1996. Extrapolat-
ing on the basis of trend growth since 1964, the Project will increase Gross
domestic Product in 1988 by 1.9 per cent and in 1996 by 4.8 per cent,
assuming the central estimate of fc. Implementation of the Project will
increase Savings by 2.3 per cent in 1988, and 5.9 per cent in 1996, and
TABLE 7
Sensitivity analysis of a change in net foreign exchange earnings by + and —15 per cent (Million
U.S. $)
Net foreign exchange earnings
of the mill
Multiplier (central estimate)
Increase in G.D.P.
Disposed of:
Increase in savings
Increase in imports
Increase in consumption from
Malawi Production
Net Improvement in Foreign
Balance
+ 15%
12.7
37.3
7.5
5.2
24.6
7.5
1988
2.94
-15%
9.4
27.6
5.5
3.9
18.2
5.5
+15%
51.5
151.4
30.3
21.2
99.9
30.3
1996
2.94
-15%
38.1
112.0
22.4
15.7
73.9
22.4
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Imports by 0.7 per cent in 1988, and by 2.0 per cent in 1996. These figures
also illustrate the fact that with the general growth of the economy, the
project should easily be absorbed in the development process.
Employment and the project
The project will have a major impact on employment possibilities in
Malawi. The primary creation of employment is estimated to be 8,200. It
has not been possible to estimate a separate employment multiplier, and it is
assumed to be roughly the same as the income multiplier. Applying the
multiplier gives a central estimate for total employment creation of 24,000
new jobs. These are employment opportunities at all levels. There will be
some concentration of new jobs around the project area, but a substantial
number of new jobs will be created in a variety of occupations throughout
the country. With 43.5 per cent of the population below the age of 15 in
1970 (NSO Population Change Survey, page 13) moving into the working
age groups, the project has an obvious contribution to make to solving the
possible problems of employment of new entrants to the labour force.
Internal rate of return and the project
In present conditions in Malawi, the economic rate of return is little
different from the financial rate of return. The cash flow includes no
subsidies and the direct taxes on inputs are very small indeed, being of the
order of $0.2 million per annum. Adjusting the price of inputs from market
prices to factor costs increases the rate of return by a fraction of one per
cent.
It is not at present Malawi Government policy to use shadow prices in
economic appraisal. The general indications are that, on the whole, market
prices net of taxes are a reasonable approximation to economic opportunity
costs. The two areas in which shadow pricing is considered from time to time
are of course labour and foreign exchange.
(a) Wages. Government has a very firm policy of restraining wages. The
minimum daily wage in Blantyre, the main commercial and industrial centre,
is 40 tambala (= $0.44) per day and, outside the main urban areas, the
minimum is 25 tambala (= $0.27) per day. As a result, there is no significant
unemployment problem and in fact there appear to be some areas of labour
shortage; there is also of course a scarcity of some skills. It appears that the
labour market is roughly in equilibrium at current wage levels, and there are
therefore no grounds for a shadow wage.
How long this view of things will be appropriate is a matter for conjec-
ture. With an estimated 43 per cent of the population under the age of 15 in
1970 the rate of growth of the working population will be rapid; should it
outstrip the rate at which employment opportunities can be created the use
of a low shadow wage rate may be appropriate in economic appraisal.
(b) Foreign exchange. Malawi's terms of trade have been deteriorating in
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recent years, and world inflation may make it difficult to maintain reserves at
a safe working level (usually 2 to 3 months import cover). Thus it may be
that, in the course of the next decade, a premium on foreign exchange may
be justified, thereby enhancing the social value of the project.
As a substantial user of labour and a net earner of foreign exchange,
shadow pricing would give an economic rate of return substantially higher
than the financial rate of return. There is therefore reason to conclude that
the project will look much more attractive in the 1980s than it does now.
The internal rate of return is estimated for the project. The benefits are
taken as the incremental stream of Gross Domestic Product, based on net
direct foreign exchange earnings per annum times the central estimate of the
multiplier. The costs of the project include all external debt service, and all
equity dividends, and that part of the soft finance which has an opportunity
cost for Malawi, in terms of benefits foregone from investment in alternative
development projects. The resulting Internal Rate of Return for the project
is 12%.
The project is based on a renewable resource namely timber. Its net
benefits may therefore be projected indefinitely into the future, in contrast
to a mineral deposit which is depleted with use. Although the application of
any discount rate will show a very small present value for distant benefits,
there are grounds for scepticism about the validity of applying DCF techni-
ques to compare projects based on renewable resources with projects based
on exhaustible resources. For two projects having the same present value at
the same discount rate, and similar in other relevant respects too, one
dependent on renewable assets is clearly preferable to one based on non-
renewable assets. The Viphya project merits whatever premium is approp-
riate for this advantage.
Unquantifiable aspects of the project
National. The direct and indirect effects of the project will create a new
pole of economic growth in the Northern Region in line with Government
policy, and more effectively than could probably be achieved by a gradualist
approach.
Linkages
(i) backward: limestone, minor tools and parts for forest and mill and
possible coal from nearby deposits,
(ii) forward: the most obvious one is the possibility of a paper mill to
manufacture long fibred paper products for export markets, both in
central and southern African countries, as their economies develop,
and overseas.
A project of this size with the overseas contacts that are inherent in its
operations can be expected to attract other industrial ventures to the
country, although it must be noted that without effective local participation
foreign investment on this scale also has its dangers as well as advantages.
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Environment. Treatment of effluent before discharge into the Lake has
been included in the project and the dispersion of emissions into the air has
been studied with satisfactory results.
Regional Issues. As a landlocked country Malawi is especially vulnerable
to disruption to its transit routes to the sea. It is assumed in this analysis that
the situation in neighbouring countries is such that imports can be received,
and the product can be exported, without undue difficulty. Considerable
emphasis is being given at an international level particularly by UNCTAD,
to devising a framework of agreements whereby the transit rights of land-
locked countries may be secured.
The multiplier and non-marginal projects
It is possible that in the smaller less developed countries a Malawi/Viphya
type of situation may frequently be found. Small countries are unlikely to
have a wide variety of resources, and the alternative to one big additional
project based on these resources may be no additional project at all. So long
as the project would not run into bottlenecks in the supply of internal
resources or of foreign exchange it would be proper to allow for multiplier
effects in appraising it.
It should be noted that the inclusion of multiplier effects will not necessar-
ily make a project look more attractive. Bottlenecks may be revealed that
either show the project to be impracticable at the macro-economic level, or
reveal the need for complementary action which may be costly to improve
its chances of success. This suggests that there is always a case for trying to
estimate multiplier effects, at least in the appraisal of larger projects.
So far we have considered the matter solely from the point of view of the
host country. From the standpoint of an international institution which
adopted the economic theorists' aim of maximising world income the case
for including multiplier effects would be weaker. Assuming its funds to be
strictly limited, the alternative to financing a project in Malawi may be
financing one in Peru—or even in the United States. Unless there are known
differences in the size of the multiplier in different countries it could then be
omitted in comparing projects. But the international community is not
indifferent to world income distribution, and several financial institutions
have been specificially created to assist the poorer countries. For these
institutions the possible alternatives will not range over the whole world,
and there will more often be a case for taking the multiplier into account in
judging whether assistance should be given to a project in a particular
country. It might be worth exploring the possibility of attaching poverty
weights (based perhaps on the reciprocal of per capita GDP) to the multip-
lier in different countries when they are competing for limited funds.
University of Leicester and
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Geneva.
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